Posts Tagged ‘us intelligence community’

In the post-Cold War world it has been publicly debated that for the CIA to remain as a viable institution it has had to justify its worth now that the Soviet threat has disappeared.  However, it has to be stressed that although the CIA has largely attempted to find itself new roles in the areas of counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics among others, the CIA has been accused[1] of playing up threats to US security either to justify its existence or to justify the immense budget that it still has.

US intelligence has had a history of playing up threats and sensationalism as noted by Real Admiral John Godfrey in 1941 when he stated that there was among US intelligence a ‘predilection for sensationalism’.[2]  This was in the context of US estimates of Nazi reserve air power being 250 per cent higher than the same estimates done by the British.  This, among many other historical examples, supports the argument that they remain this way today.[3]

For instance a report funded by the CIA on Japan’s desire to economically dominate in the world ‘has elicited embarrassed disclaimers from those allegedly involved with it, including the intelligence agency itself.’[4]  The reason for this is that firstly, this report was written when the CIA was still attempting to justify its role in the post-Cold War era, and secondly, that many, as discussed in the previous article, have urged the CIA to become involved in commercial espionage.  This appears to be an attempt to justify its role, as well as providing grounds for branching out into new areas of espionage and intelligence.[5]

Jeffrey-Jones also argues that the CIA has played up threats to US security stating:

‘US intelligence deficiencies have in no small measure arisen from the fact that the CIA operates in the shadow of the confidence man.  In his various guises, the CIA conman has conjured up one scare after another to line his pockets with dollars.’[6]

Much has been highlighted by the media about the prevalence of terrorism in the post-Cold War world and it is true that there is here a formidable enemy for the CIA.  This was realised on September 11th by the public.  The CIA had always seen terrorism as a threat even during the Cold War, but with the collapse of the Soviet Union this threat became so much more real as the struggles frozen by the Cold War defrosted.  The CIA may have before attempted to justify its existence citing terrorism as a reason, but due to CIA failures to halt the events of September 11th it no longer has to justify its existence.  The threat of terrorism has clearly been framed in people’s minds by the pictures of the World Trade Center towers crumbling to the ground.

There has been no realisation of the peace dividend that was envisioned at the end of the Cold War with the USA spending ‘five times as much on intelligence as the whole of Europe combined, and more on intelligence than Russia spends on its entire military.’[7]  This budget has to be justified in light of there no longer being a Soviet threat, however, much of the funding is fought over with the FBI and the new Homeland Department.  There are limited resources and funds and all agencies want more and are therefore putting more credence on their role and the reverse on the role of rivals.

This has almost become a tradition among different agencies: ‘Turf wars and information hoarding are endemic to all intelligence bureaucracies. The protection of “sources and methods” has long been an obstacle to information sharing’.[8]  This has undoubtedly led to poor communication between agencies and has compromised the effectiveness of their operations.

Post-September 11th Tom Ridge was appointed as the director of homeland security[9] and given the role of defending the US against principally terrorism.  This agency is another budgetary threat to the CIA on top of that already posed by the FBI.  Therefore, the question has to be asked, as it was by Senator Joseph Leiberman, that when the new agency relies on intelligence from both the CIA and FBI, will it become simply a ‘passive customer’[10] of the intelligence that is passed on to it by the CIA.  The CIA has control of the intelligence passed to the new department and therefore can effectively control and direct its actions, limiting its budget.  This kind of competition is unhealthy for the security of the nation and also an unfair attempt by the CIA to maintain superiority in the intelligence community.

Whether the CIA has fulfilled its originally intended role is highly debatable. The CIA does carry out those operations stipulated in the National Security Act of 1947.  However, it has to be asked to what extent the CIA has effectively carried them out in the changing structures, not only of the international system but also of the US government and agencies.

Despite the immense budget of the CIA, the USA was not able to foresee and stop the events of September 11th 2001.  As Jeffrey-Jones points out, intelligence failure has in the past been met simply with financial reward as highlighted by the expensive creation of the OSS and CIA after the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.[11]  Rather than simply throw money at the problem there is a much greater task of restructuring the efforts of the CIA so that they meet the threats posed.

There are plenty of examples of intelligence failure, most notable the failure to sufficiently foreworn the relevant authorities who would have been able to stop the attacks of September 11th.  However, the common response has been such as that of former CIA officer Walter Millis that this called for expansion in intelligence.[12]  This response of simply increasing funds or expanding activities is a common US response but it does not necessarily achieve the best results possible.

The rethinking of organisation with regards to homeland security post-September 11th was a step in the right direction, but this needs to be mirrored in the CIA and FBI for the system to work to the best of its ability.  The problems the CIA faces in fulfilling its originally envisioned role is highlighted by the following:

‘The CIA has operational missions to collect human intelligence and conduct covert action. It is also responsible for the analysis and publication of national intelligence estimates. The agency cannot perform both tasks well.’[13]


[1] Jeffrey-Jones, R. ‘The CIA Con-trick’, History Today, (December 2001) Volume 51, Issue 12. P. 20

[2] Ibid

[3] Ibid

[4] Awanohara, S. ‘Paradigm Paranoia: CIA Report Warns of Japanese Economic Domination’, Far Eastern Economic Review, (27/06/1991) Volume 152, Issue 26

[5] Ibid

[6] Op Cit. Jeffrey-Jones, R. P. 20

[7] Ibid

[8] Stubbing, R. & Goodman, M. ‘How to fix US Intelligence’, (26/06/2002) Christian Science Monitor

[9] Editorial, ‘Don’t Let Turf Wars Interfere’, (08/06/2002) South Florida Sun-Sentinel

[10] Kramer, M. ‘No Place Like Homeland For FBI, CIA’, (14/06/2002) New York Daily News

[11] Op Cit. Jeffrey-Jones, R. P. 20

[12] Ibid. P. 21

[13] Op Cit. Stubbing, R. & Goodman, M.


Sam Hunter is the author of fiction novel Makaveli’s Prince.

Available on Amazon

Since the end of the Cold War there has been a change in the nature of the international system and consequently the threats faced by the USA.  The 14th century Spanish writer Don Juan Manuel, writing at the time of the Christian-Moslem conflict, believed that hot wars ended in decisive victory and peace, whereas cold war could never bring peace.[1]  This can certainly be seen in the case of the USA in the post-Cold War era and the threats faced by the CIA.

It is important to understand the nature of the international system which forms the background to intelligence gathering and analysis.  During the Cold War it was bipolar whereas, ‘Today the structure of power is like a three-dimensional chess game.’[2]  This increased intricacy of world politics means a higher degree of uncertainty.

The importance of estimative intelligence analysis has increased, because of systemic changes internationally, and will be discussed later.  The overriding threat of the Soviet Union has disappeared and uncertainty has increased with rapid change becoming a more common feature of the international system.  Threats post-Cold War are not entirely new but the threats faced by the CIA have certainly become more diverse.  These threats are largely those that were held in suspension by the Cold War powers, such as the religious and ethnic conflicts that can be seen to have arisen in the past ten years:[3]

‘For example, a mid-1990s mission statement by CIA staff listed a new range of special targets.  It still identified China and Russia as problem nations, but also called for intelligence resources to be concentrated on ‘rogue’ states like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq and on transitional threats such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation.’[4]

Former DCI Woolsey stated that ‘the world is more unpredictable, hence more dangerous; so the focus of spying will change—to nuclear proliferation, counter-terrorism, and regional and ethnic instability—but its scope will not shrink.’[5]  Therefore, now the Cold War is over the CIA has moved its focus away from the previous threat of large nation-states and it has begun to reassess its role, finding one in combating rogue, non-state actors who employ methods such as terrorism to achieve their objectives.[6]

However, even with the Cold War over, is the CIA ‘still seeing red’?[7]  Most writers and sources agree that due to the CIA losing the threat of communism at the end of the Cold War, the CIA was struggling to remain a viable arm of the government and therefore set about detaching itself from its Cold War history.  Thus, the CIA began to insist there was a need for it to combat the many new threats the USA was faced with in this new period.[8]  This was supported by Casey, the former DCI (1981-87), notes Jeffrey-Jones who stated that:

‘the intelligence community had a responsibility for ‘scouting the future’ and identifying a ‘broad spectrum’ of problems stretching ‘past the year 2000’.  This perspective indicates Casey’s appreciation that US intelligence history should not be pinned to the Cold War years.  It marks him as a pragmatist and spin-doctor who wanted the CIA to stay in business.’[9]

Before the recent increases in publicity that terrorism has gained since September 11th, those who wished to retain the intelligence apparatus of the CIA had won the argument to do so in the USA.  It is quite clear that intelligence was around before the Cold War in various guises and therefore not a Cold War creation, and thus it would not end with the Cold War.  The need for intelligence work done by the CIA has continued into the 1990s and into the 21st century, but whether there is a need for the Cold War techniques of covert action in peace time is still debated. [10]  However, despite this clear continued need for intelligence, it is still claimed that the CIA remains rooted in the Cold War.

According to CIA spokeswoman Anya Guilsher, the Counter-Narcotics Center, newly renamed Crime and Narcotics Center, has increased in size by four times since its conception.  This indicates that the CIA is taking on counter-narcotics as a significant part of its role in the post-Cold War era.  However, many officers especially in the Directorate of Operations (DO) are reported as being trapped in a Cold War mentality, maintaining relationships with rightwing paramilitaries, especially in Colombia, with poor human rights records.  This creates a conflict of interest for the CIA as this new role of counter-narcotics is hindered by the fact that the same Cold War rightwing allies are either involved in the drugs trafficking or use illegal paramilitary forces to traffic the drugs.  These illegal paramilitary groups are equitable with death squads, as they kill ‘trade unionists, peasant leaders, human-rights monitors, journalists, and other suspected “subversives.”’[11]

This suggests that the CIA may still be more interested in fighting leftist guerrillas than in fulfilling its role of counter-narcotics.  This is supported by the reordering of Colombian forces that was undertaken on US advice.  According to the US this was part of the war on drugs, when in fact ‘the order instructed the new intelligence networks to focus on leftist guerrillas or “the armed subversion.”’[12]  Despite the CIA being responsible for increases in narcotics activity in areas such as the Magdalena Valley it has in other areas effectively fought against the drug trafficking, but this conflict of CIA goals has in Colombia intensified a civil war.  However, this clear pursuit of contrary goals suggests that the CIA is still attempting to find a way to cement itself into the new roles it has found for itself post-Cold War and that it has found it hard to shake off its previous roles.[13]

To assess the new roles taken on by the CIA in the post-Cold War world the above-mentioned changes in the international system have to be understood in the context of US policy makers needing to know whether there will be another terrorist attack such as the one on September 11th, and whether rogue nations have been spreading their weapons of mass destruction.  Policy makers need to know which countries will become unstable due to ethnic and regional self-determination unrest and conflict.  There is still also a need for the US to know what types of armed forces US troops could find themselves combating and with what weapons they will be faced, either in combat or on peacekeeping exercises.[14]

The CIA must, therefore, not only take on these new roles but find the way in which to move forward in order to undertake them most effectively.  David Ignatius, assistant managing editor of the Washington Post, argues that there is a consensus among many people either in or who have recently left the CIA on the way in which the CIA should move forward in the post-Cold War world.  It is that the DO (Directorate of Operations), should reduce in size, becoming ‘more focused in selecting its targets and tougher about maintaining quality control.’[15]  This has to some extent already happened with reductions of 25 percent, but Ignatius states that unnamed CIA officials feel that the reduction should be much more, a reduction that would bring them inline with that of the British intelligence agency MI6.[16]

However, this has to be contrast with the thesis of former CIA operative Robert Baer:

‘By the mid-1990s, the CIA was shrivelling up every where in Europe.  Our offices in Bonn, Paris, and Rome were shadows of what they had been during the cold war with the Soviet Union.  They lacked the officers to go after Europe’s vast Middle Eastern communities, and those they did have too often lacked the inclination, the training, and in some cases the incentive to do so.’[17]

Essentially, his argument is that the CIA needs eyes on the street to carryout their function effectively.  He makes the point that it is essential to ‘recruit and run sources in the mosques, the casbahs, or anywhere else we can learn what the bad guy’s intentions are’.[18]

However, within the CIA these changes have already had an impact on the role of the CIA.  The reduction in size of the DO has forced the CIA to find priorities in the post-Cold War world, for instance the number of stations in Africa has been halved compared to previous years: ‘The spymasters are increasingly asking the basic question: What secrets do we really need to steal in Gabon, or Uruguay or Denmark?’[19]  However, in the intelligence world being forced to pick priorities puts the CIA in a bad position as while it may have taken its eyes of one target, particularly Islamic fundamentalists, a lot of damage can be caused as witnessed on September 11th.  This reduction in man power has caused further integration of the DO and the Directorate of Intelligence (DI), previously deskbound analysts.  This has to a large extent increased the value of the analysts as they work together with operators in special centres that came into being at the end of the Cold War.  However, whether this has really improved the operation of intelligence gathering remains to be seen.  This is noted by Baer who states:

‘Like the rest of Washington, the CIA had fallen in love with technology.  The theory was that satellites, the Internet, electronic intercepts, even academic publications would tell us all we needed to know about what went on beyond our borders…the official view had become that our allies in Europe and the Middle East could fill in the missing pieces.’[20]

It is quite clear that despite the ever increasing value of technology and analysts they can never replace the operatives on the street that can tell you what people are thinking and what goes on behind closed doors.[21]

The Counter-Terrorism Center was created in 1985, the Counter-Intelligence Center created in 1989, and the Counter-Narcotics Center created in 1990.  This, along with the appointment of analysts to foreign postings[22] has seen the change in role of the CIA move further away from the covert operations of its Cold War years and further into the area of analysis and estimative intelligence.

This change has been partly precipitated by the change in nature of the threat.  Undercover agents can no longer gain information ‘at diplomatic receptions waiting for a KGB officer to get drunk.’[23]  The threats of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction require much more planning to deal with and also require sophisticated electronics equipment for communications intercepts in which the NSA often provides assistance to the CIA.  This is understandable because as a former DCI stated ‘Terrorists don’t go to cocktail parties on the embassy circuit.’[24]  Although this might be quite clear it does not necessarily justify simply cutting down the numbers of agents.  Baer would suggest that you simply don’t go to the cocktail parties to recruit them, but instead the places that terrorists do go.[25]

This change in the role of the CIA during the 1990s occurred as the debate on intelligence activities intensified, partially due to the fact that the adversary of the Soviet Union was now gone but also in part due to the 1994 arrest of Aldrich Ames, a spy of nine years within the CIA for the Soviet Union and then Russia.  This caused calls for a review of the intelligence community as a whole.  A 17-member commission was set up along with another review led by Texas Representative Larry Combest.  As the chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence his view that the intelligence community should become leaner and more efficient was held to be true.[26]

The end of the Cold War showed that the future can hold surprises.  However, policy makers still need accurate predictions on future events and scenarios as Stubbing notes: ‘Accurate and timely intelligence is the critical first line of defence against terrorism, America’s major national security threat in the 21st Century.’[27]  It is therefore, the role of intelligence to do this, analysing intelligence and separating the accurate from the inaccurate.  This role, although current throughout the history of the CIA, has become more prevalent now that the Cold War is over.  It is a role that does not get good press, as the predictions that most frequently reach the papers are those that are wrong.  Those that are correct largely go unnoticed, while many others that are right, such as those negative assessments of the situation in Vietnam in the 1960s, are not welcomed by the policy makers.[28]

As already stated above, the importance of estimative intelligence has increased because of changes in the international system with the demise of the Soviet and communist ideology. Uncertainty has therefore increased and rapid change has become a feature of world politics today.  Policy makers are thus much more in need of up-to-date intelligence analysis and estimations.  The CIA is needed to undertake estimative analysis to help solve and ultimately win the three-dimensional chess game the US is presented with on the world stage.

There is a parallel that can be drawn between the CIA’s progressively broadening recruitment base and the extent to which it is prepared to take on the role of co-operation with counterparts in other nations around the world.  However, as the CIA has become increasingly more tolerant in recent years, possibly in reflection of ‘the cosmopolitan composition of the George W. Bush cabinet’[29] it has become much more, but not extensively involved in co-operation with its counterparts worldwide.  A directive from President Clinton in 1994 was to ensure further sharing of information, but not at the expense of compromising sources and agents.  Much closer work has therefore been seen with the UN on a number of issues.[30]  Most notably this could be seen with the weapons inspections teams in Iraq: ‘US intelligence support to the UN in the areas like refugee policy, peacekeeping and non-proliferation reached in the words of one authority, ‘an unprecedented level’.’[31]

The CIA also faces other more abstract problems since the end of the Cold War, one of which Nye highlights as ‘the increase in the ratio of mysteries to secrets in the questions that policymakers want answered.’[32]  Secrets comprise information that the CIA could steal through its network of spies or through use of technology, but mysteries are something which it is impossible to steal the answer to.  The example used by Nye is: ‘Will President Boris Yeltsin be able to control inflation in Russia a year from now?’[33]  This is the type of abstract problem that the CIA has increasingly found itself tasked with and to which it is still trying to find an efficient and effective solution.

Former DCI Woolsey stated that the CIA may become involved in economic intelligence in the same fashion as many other nations are, that they could use spies to win contracts for US companies and to gain foreign company secrets, but also to defend the US companies from the same threat.[34]  In 1993 DCI ‘Mr Woolsey has made headlines by calling industrial espionage “the hottest topic in intelligence policy”; by confirming, on February 24th, that North Korea now has enough material to build a nuclear weapon; and by laying out, in an unusual public hearing on March 9th, his vision for the role of spying in the post-cold-war world. “Yes,” he says, “we have slain the dragon. But we live in a jungle tilled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes.”’[35]


[1] Manuel, Don Juan, Escritores en Prosa Anteriores al Siglo XV, (1952), Biblioteca de Autores Espanoles de Rivadeneira, Madrid.

[2] Nye, J. Jr. ‘Peering Into the Future’, Foreign Affairs, (July/August 1994) Volume 73, Issue 4

[3] Ibid.

[4] Jeffrey-Jones, R. ‘The CIA Con-trick’, History Today, (December 2001) Volume 51, Issue 12. P. 21

[5] Anonymous, ‘Lexinton: Indiana Jim and the temple of spooks’, The Economist, (20/03/1993) Volume 326, Issue 7803

[6] Thiermann, O. & Messing, F. Jr. ‘Assassination Policy Revisited’, (06/10/2002) The Washington Times

[7] Smyth, F. ‘Still seeing Red’, (01/06/1998) The Progressive

[8] Op Cit. Jeffrey-Jones, R. P. 21

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid. P. 22

[11] Smyth, F. ‘Still seeing Red’, (01/06/1998) The Progressive

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Op Cit. Nye, J. Jr.

[15] Ignatius, D. ‘Downspying The CIA; After the Cold War, A Covert search For a New Mission’, (05/03/1995) The Washington Post

[16] Ibid.

[17] Baer, R. ‘See No Evil’, (2002) Arrow Books, UK. P. ixi

[18] Ibid. P. xxii

[19] Op Cit. Ignatius, D.

[20] Op Cit. Baer, R. P. xx

[21] Ibid. P. 112

[22] Op Cit. Ignatius, D.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Op Cit. Baer, R. P. xxii

[26] Editorial, ‘CIA Shakeup, How Should we Redesign our Intelligence Services?’, (02/04/1995) The Dallas Morning News

[27] Stubbing, R. & Goodman, M. ‘How to fix US Intelligence’, (26/06/2002) Christian Science Monitor

[28] Op Cit. Nye, J. Jr.

[29] Op Cit. Jeffrey-Jones, R. P. 22

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Op Cit. Nye, J. Jr.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Op Cit. Anonymous

[35] Ibid.


Sam Hunter is the author of fiction novel Makaveli’s Prince.

Available on Amazon

The historical context behind the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency was covered by the last article ‘What are the Historical Origins of the CIA?‘  That context was one of many problems faced by the US intelligence community and was instrumental in the creation of the CIA.

The CIA was created in the first instance to solve the historical problems that the US intelligence community had faced.  The need for an intelligence agency that solved the problems of rivalry that existed between the various intelligence branches of the armed services and of the government was quite evident even before the increase in demand for intelligence during the Second World War.  The CIA was not created simply because there was no significant co-ordinating and central body present to organise intelligence, but also because the US intelligence networks were far surpassed by those of its allies and of its enemies pre-World War Two.  The development of the OSS during the war and the subsequent organisations resulting in the creation of the CIA can be seen as an attempt to solve this problem of a lack of a significant intelligence apparatus.  The events and intelligence problems of the Second World War, especially highlighted by the Hoover Commission on the attack at Pearl Harbor, showed firstly the need for the CIA and secondly the areas of intelligence deficiency and inefficiency that the CIA would become involved in.

The National Security Act of 1947, that gave birth to the CIA, directed the CIA towards solving these problems.  This National Security Act attempted to define the role of the CIA and to set out the functions that it was envisaged to do.  However, it was rather limited in one respect.  Although it defined the function of the CIA it was almost impossible to define the methods they were to employ in carrying out that function.  This was largely due to the fact they were ‘indefinable and unorthodox methods.’[1]

However, despite this problem there are several clear messages that stand out from the National Security Act of 1947.  The CIA was to advise the National Security Council on intelligence relating to national security.  This established a clear relationship between the CIA and the National Security Council.  The National Security Act also stipulates that the CIA was to make recommendations for the co-ordination of intelligence activities to the NSC.  The CIA was also to examine information and intelligence that related to national security and support other agencies and branches of government by disseminating the relevant information and intelligence. Linked to this support of other agencies is the idea that the CIA would perform functions that the NSC deemed better suited to a central organisation.[2]

The National Security Act of 1947 did briefly stipulate some activities that the CIA was not to perform.  That it should not have a police force, subpoena or law-enforcement powers.  The National Security Act also significantly laid down that the CIA should not be engaged in ‘internal security functions.’[3]  This was quite clearly an attempt to prevent the CIA, or those in control of it, from achieving power in the way that so many other tyrants had done.  Most notably, as had been the case in Italy, Germany and the Soviet Union the intelligence apparatus had become much more than an apparatus for gathering intelligence.  This was one aspect that people, not just those in government but also those on the street, were wary of.  It was due to these fears that the legislation enacted in the 1947 National Security Act attempted to limit the role of the CIA.[4]

However, the phrase ‘such other functions and duties’[5] allowed a rather large amount of space for the CIA to expand its operations into areas that the NSC ‘may from time to time direct’.[6]  This was Section 102 of the 1947 National Security Act that essentially gave the CIA scope to expand their operations in almost any direction and was what ‘created the furores in the United States and abroad.’[7]  Clark Clifford wrote in ‘Counsel to the President’:

‘The ‘other’ functions the CIA was to perform were purposely not specified but we understood that they would include covert activities. We did not mention them by name because we felt it would be injurious to our national interest to advertise the fact that we might engage in such activities… In light of the continuing controversy over the role and activities of the CIA, it bears emphasizing that it was by act of Congress that the CIA was established and exists today, and it was by act of Congress that covert operations were authorised.’[8]

There was clearly some difference in opinion over the role of the CIA especially referring to the ‘other functions’ that may be carried out, as noted by General Counsel Lawrence Houston, who stated:

‘…review of the debates indicates that Congress was primarily interested in an agency for coordinating intelligence and originally did not propose any overseas collection activities for the CIA… We do not believe that there was any doubt in the minds of Congress that the Central Intelligence Agency under this authority would take positive action for subversion and sabotage… It is our conclusion, therefore, that neither MO [morale operations, i.e. covert propaganda] or SO [special operations] should be undertaken without previously informing Congress and obtaining its approval of the functions and the expenditure of funds for these purposes.’[9]

These statements were essentially admissions that there were indefinable areas of CIA activity and that there was in some areas no possible way to lay down its role as there were no precise standard operating procedures.  This section of the 1947 National Security Act does, however, put the responsibility of these other functions and duties on the NSC.  So although people are in theory accountable for such other functions of CIA activity, it is interesting to note that the President as a member of the NSC, and all other members being subordinate to him, does in effect have a relatively free rein over the actions of the CIA.  Therefore the President can define a significant part of the role of the CIA.  This was the case in the early years of the CIA and has been since.  Despite attempts by legislators to further define the role of the CIA in the 1970s, there was no significant revision of the 1947 National Security Act and it ‘still remains, the conceptual basis for the existence of a Central Intelligence Agency, as well as for the manner in which it has operated’.[10]

It is interesting to note that what has caused the most fear over CIA activity is not strictly its activities and role, but that of its secrecy.  Groups worldwide who rightly or wrongly accuse the CIA, for whatever they need a scapegoat for, do so knowing the agency and its members will observe silence over CIA activities.  This has unfortunately led to an assumption of guilt surrounding the CIA activities and their role. The policy of no denial and no conformation is kept simply to protect the intelligence networks they have, but it does have the effect of apparent guilt.  Although many of the accusations are plausible and a smaller number of those probable, the policy has been upheld even in the face of obviously flawed accusations of ‘responsibility for poor skiing conditions at St Moritz’.[11]  However, the CIA and those who direct its activities are in theory ‘accountable to the American people through the intelligence oversight committees of the U.S. Congress.’[12]

The 1947 National Security Act was not explicit in establishing any programme for intelligence activities.  This was established through either executive order by the President or through National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs).  These were the most significant factors in determining what the specific tasks and role the CIA was to undertake.  The 1947 National Security Act in conjunction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff created an intelligence operation known as the Joint Intelligence Group (J-2).  However, the National Security Act of 1947 along with the NSCIDs and J-2 had created a decentralised intelligence apparatus in the Department of state and each military branch, which it would become the task of the CIA and Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to co-ordinate.[13]

That role specified within the National Security Act of 1947 was in line with the traditional view of what an intelligence organisation should do.  This corresponded with the view that was held by Allen Dulles, DCI from February 1953 to 1961.  He was the first civilian to hold the position of DCI, a veteran in the intelligence community having served in both the wars.  He was Donovan’s wartime Chief of Mission in Bern during the Second World War and also the brother of John Foster Dulles who was Eisenhower’s Secretary of State.[14]  Due to him being one of the first DCIs, but also because of his experience and the connections he had, he held significant influence over the direction the CIA was to take in its early life.  Dulles held the view that the CIA was to ‘collect information, assess facts, specify the conclusions in a manner that would enable other people, or agencies of government, to act intelligently and – hopefully – wisely.’[15]  Dulles also held the view that the intelligence community and more specifically the CIA, should not get involved in anyway with policy formation and stated that ‘The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy.’[16]  He also felt that the role of the CIA should be strictly limited to collating ‘the hard facts on which others must determine policy’.[17]  However, it was this period at the beginning of the Cold War, especially under Dulles, that the role of the CIA developed and deviated from that which was originally intended.


[1] Paine, L. The CIA at Work, (1977) Robert Hale London, UK. P. 17

[2] Wise, D. & Ross, T. The Invisible Government: The CIA and US Intelligence, (1974) Vintage Books, USA. 94

[3] Ibid. P. 94

[4] Op Cit. Paine, L. P. 20

[5] Op Cit. Wise, D. & Ross T. P. 94

[6] Ibid. P. 94

[7] Op Cit. Paine, L. P. 19

[8] Clifford, C. ‘Counsel to the President: A Memoir’, (1991) New York, P. 169 – 170. cited in Rudgers, D. ‘The Origins of Covert Action’, Journal of Contemporary History, (April 2000) Volume 35, Number 2. P. 249

[9] Houston to Hillenkoetter, 25 September 1947, FRUS, P. 622-3, cited in Rudgers, D. ‘The Origins of Covert Action’, Journal of Contemporary History, (April 2000) Volume 35, Number 2. P. 256

[10] Op Cit. Paine, L. P. 19

[11] Ibid. P. 21

[12] CIA Official Web Site, ‘About the CIA’, (February 2003), https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/index.html

[13] Fain, T. ‘The Intelligence Community: History, Origins, and Issues’, Public Documentary Series, (1977), R. R. Bowker Co. UK. P. 15

[14] Op Cit. Paine, L. P. 15-16

[15] Ibid. P. 17

[16] Ibid. P. 17

[17] Ibid. P. 17


Sam Hunter is the author of fiction novel Makaveli’s Prince.

Available on Amazon