Posts Tagged ‘office of strategic services’

The historical context behind the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency was covered by the last article ‘What are the Historical Origins of the CIA?‘  That context was one of many problems faced by the US intelligence community and was instrumental in the creation of the CIA.

The CIA was created in the first instance to solve the historical problems that the US intelligence community had faced.  The need for an intelligence agency that solved the problems of rivalry that existed between the various intelligence branches of the armed services and of the government was quite evident even before the increase in demand for intelligence during the Second World War.  The CIA was not created simply because there was no significant co-ordinating and central body present to organise intelligence, but also because the US intelligence networks were far surpassed by those of its allies and of its enemies pre-World War Two.  The development of the OSS during the war and the subsequent organisations resulting in the creation of the CIA can be seen as an attempt to solve this problem of a lack of a significant intelligence apparatus.  The events and intelligence problems of the Second World War, especially highlighted by the Hoover Commission on the attack at Pearl Harbor, showed firstly the need for the CIA and secondly the areas of intelligence deficiency and inefficiency that the CIA would become involved in.

The National Security Act of 1947, that gave birth to the CIA, directed the CIA towards solving these problems.  This National Security Act attempted to define the role of the CIA and to set out the functions that it was envisaged to do.  However, it was rather limited in one respect.  Although it defined the function of the CIA it was almost impossible to define the methods they were to employ in carrying out that function.  This was largely due to the fact they were ‘indefinable and unorthodox methods.’[1]

However, despite this problem there are several clear messages that stand out from the National Security Act of 1947.  The CIA was to advise the National Security Council on intelligence relating to national security.  This established a clear relationship between the CIA and the National Security Council.  The National Security Act also stipulates that the CIA was to make recommendations for the co-ordination of intelligence activities to the NSC.  The CIA was also to examine information and intelligence that related to national security and support other agencies and branches of government by disseminating the relevant information and intelligence. Linked to this support of other agencies is the idea that the CIA would perform functions that the NSC deemed better suited to a central organisation.[2]

The National Security Act of 1947 did briefly stipulate some activities that the CIA was not to perform.  That it should not have a police force, subpoena or law-enforcement powers.  The National Security Act also significantly laid down that the CIA should not be engaged in ‘internal security functions.’[3]  This was quite clearly an attempt to prevent the CIA, or those in control of it, from achieving power in the way that so many other tyrants had done.  Most notably, as had been the case in Italy, Germany and the Soviet Union the intelligence apparatus had become much more than an apparatus for gathering intelligence.  This was one aspect that people, not just those in government but also those on the street, were wary of.  It was due to these fears that the legislation enacted in the 1947 National Security Act attempted to limit the role of the CIA.[4]

However, the phrase ‘such other functions and duties’[5] allowed a rather large amount of space for the CIA to expand its operations into areas that the NSC ‘may from time to time direct’.[6]  This was Section 102 of the 1947 National Security Act that essentially gave the CIA scope to expand their operations in almost any direction and was what ‘created the furores in the United States and abroad.’[7]  Clark Clifford wrote in ‘Counsel to the President’:

‘The ‘other’ functions the CIA was to perform were purposely not specified but we understood that they would include covert activities. We did not mention them by name because we felt it would be injurious to our national interest to advertise the fact that we might engage in such activities… In light of the continuing controversy over the role and activities of the CIA, it bears emphasizing that it was by act of Congress that the CIA was established and exists today, and it was by act of Congress that covert operations were authorised.’[8]

There was clearly some difference in opinion over the role of the CIA especially referring to the ‘other functions’ that may be carried out, as noted by General Counsel Lawrence Houston, who stated:

‘…review of the debates indicates that Congress was primarily interested in an agency for coordinating intelligence and originally did not propose any overseas collection activities for the CIA… We do not believe that there was any doubt in the minds of Congress that the Central Intelligence Agency under this authority would take positive action for subversion and sabotage… It is our conclusion, therefore, that neither MO [morale operations, i.e. covert propaganda] or SO [special operations] should be undertaken without previously informing Congress and obtaining its approval of the functions and the expenditure of funds for these purposes.’[9]

These statements were essentially admissions that there were indefinable areas of CIA activity and that there was in some areas no possible way to lay down its role as there were no precise standard operating procedures.  This section of the 1947 National Security Act does, however, put the responsibility of these other functions and duties on the NSC.  So although people are in theory accountable for such other functions of CIA activity, it is interesting to note that the President as a member of the NSC, and all other members being subordinate to him, does in effect have a relatively free rein over the actions of the CIA.  Therefore the President can define a significant part of the role of the CIA.  This was the case in the early years of the CIA and has been since.  Despite attempts by legislators to further define the role of the CIA in the 1970s, there was no significant revision of the 1947 National Security Act and it ‘still remains, the conceptual basis for the existence of a Central Intelligence Agency, as well as for the manner in which it has operated’.[10]

It is interesting to note that what has caused the most fear over CIA activity is not strictly its activities and role, but that of its secrecy.  Groups worldwide who rightly or wrongly accuse the CIA, for whatever they need a scapegoat for, do so knowing the agency and its members will observe silence over CIA activities.  This has unfortunately led to an assumption of guilt surrounding the CIA activities and their role. The policy of no denial and no conformation is kept simply to protect the intelligence networks they have, but it does have the effect of apparent guilt.  Although many of the accusations are plausible and a smaller number of those probable, the policy has been upheld even in the face of obviously flawed accusations of ‘responsibility for poor skiing conditions at St Moritz’.[11]  However, the CIA and those who direct its activities are in theory ‘accountable to the American people through the intelligence oversight committees of the U.S. Congress.’[12]

The 1947 National Security Act was not explicit in establishing any programme for intelligence activities.  This was established through either executive order by the President or through National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs).  These were the most significant factors in determining what the specific tasks and role the CIA was to undertake.  The 1947 National Security Act in conjunction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff created an intelligence operation known as the Joint Intelligence Group (J-2).  However, the National Security Act of 1947 along with the NSCIDs and J-2 had created a decentralised intelligence apparatus in the Department of state and each military branch, which it would become the task of the CIA and Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to co-ordinate.[13]

That role specified within the National Security Act of 1947 was in line with the traditional view of what an intelligence organisation should do.  This corresponded with the view that was held by Allen Dulles, DCI from February 1953 to 1961.  He was the first civilian to hold the position of DCI, a veteran in the intelligence community having served in both the wars.  He was Donovan’s wartime Chief of Mission in Bern during the Second World War and also the brother of John Foster Dulles who was Eisenhower’s Secretary of State.[14]  Due to him being one of the first DCIs, but also because of his experience and the connections he had, he held significant influence over the direction the CIA was to take in its early life.  Dulles held the view that the CIA was to ‘collect information, assess facts, specify the conclusions in a manner that would enable other people, or agencies of government, to act intelligently and – hopefully – wisely.’[15]  Dulles also held the view that the intelligence community and more specifically the CIA, should not get involved in anyway with policy formation and stated that ‘The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy.’[16]  He also felt that the role of the CIA should be strictly limited to collating ‘the hard facts on which others must determine policy’.[17]  However, it was this period at the beginning of the Cold War, especially under Dulles, that the role of the CIA developed and deviated from that which was originally intended.


[1] Paine, L. The CIA at Work, (1977) Robert Hale London, UK. P. 17

[2] Wise, D. & Ross, T. The Invisible Government: The CIA and US Intelligence, (1974) Vintage Books, USA. 94

[3] Ibid. P. 94

[4] Op Cit. Paine, L. P. 20

[5] Op Cit. Wise, D. & Ross T. P. 94

[6] Ibid. P. 94

[7] Op Cit. Paine, L. P. 19

[8] Clifford, C. ‘Counsel to the President: A Memoir’, (1991) New York, P. 169 – 170. cited in Rudgers, D. ‘The Origins of Covert Action’, Journal of Contemporary History, (April 2000) Volume 35, Number 2. P. 249

[9] Houston to Hillenkoetter, 25 September 1947, FRUS, P. 622-3, cited in Rudgers, D. ‘The Origins of Covert Action’, Journal of Contemporary History, (April 2000) Volume 35, Number 2. P. 256

[10] Op Cit. Paine, L. P. 19

[11] Ibid. P. 21

[12] CIA Official Web Site, ‘About the CIA’, (February 2003), https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/index.html

[13] Fain, T. ‘The Intelligence Community: History, Origins, and Issues’, Public Documentary Series, (1977), R. R. Bowker Co. UK. P. 15

[14] Op Cit. Paine, L. P. 15-16

[15] Ibid. P. 17

[16] Ibid. P. 17

[17] Ibid. P. 17


Sam Hunter is the author of fiction novel Makaveli’s Prince.

Available on Amazon

The Office of Co-ordination of Information, which was a relatively small agency, spawned the rather larger and more powerful wartime Office of Strategic Services known as the OSS.  It was this organisation, founded in 1941, which laid the groundwork and foundations for the later Central Intelligence Agency.  However, what came before any of these agencies was the Federal Bureau of Investigation, founded in 1908, which appeared to have assumed the task of an intelligence-gathering agency, due to its role, which involved acting on crimes committed against the United States of America.

As the USA became involved in World War Two the civilian nature of the FBI did not lend itself well to the role of intelligence gathering and thus the overlapping intelligence networks slipped further under the control of the wartime intelligence networks that were run by the armed forces.  Even in the peaceful western hemisphere the domain of Latin America, which had previously been exclusively that of the FBI, fell into the hands of other intelligence agencies and the FBI returned to operating within US national boundaries.  During the Second World War intelligence gathering was run largely by the armed forces.  However, there was a significant area where intelligence networks overlapped, as there were still a large number of agencies that were involved in gathering intelligence.  Not only did each armed service have its own intelligence operations, but also there were intelligence units of the US Department of State and the Treasury Bureau operating in the same field. [1]

According to Paine, the US at this time compared to Russia and Germany was ‘the nation with the least sophisticated and experienced Intelligence community, and the only one which had never maintained an adequate peacetime or wartime Intelligence service’.[2]  This is quite clear, especially after the disastrous events of Pearl Harbor, because the Pearl Harbor inquiries bear out the fact that there was no efficient collation of intelligence, which could then be analysed so as to warn of the impending Japanese attack.  According to the Hoover Commission in 1955, ‘The CIA may well attribute its existence to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and to the post war investigation into the part Intelligence or lack of Intelligence played in the failure of our military forces to receive adequate and prompt warning of the impending Japanese attack.’[3]

The CIA was not created until several years later.  Prior to the establishment of the CIA, General William J. Donovan helped with the conception and creation of the OSS, initially envisaged as a civilian agency.  However, it became apparent that this status would not serve to the advantage of the agency, as civilians in the time of war were not best suited to the job that would be undertaken.  This job was not to be like that of the FBI, although in some aspects the OSS would be modelled on the FBI, it was ‘created to abet conflict; clandestine, covert, secret war, but still war.’[4]  The militarisation of the agency was much better accepted with the advent of US involvement in World War Two.

The OSS was first recognised and made famous by operations that involved dropping parachutists behind enemy lines in a number of countries during the war.[5]  It became much more than an intelligence gathering organisation.  It also employed ‘a society of assassins, and an organisation of propagandists, demolitionists, terrorists, underground organizers, infiltrators, forgers, anarchists’.[6]  These were all employed in the war effort to inflict damage on the enemy and so help to win the war.  This combination of skills was something later followed and practiced by the CIA.[7]

This process of militarisation was only reversed after the end of the war.  The idea that there was no longer a need for uniforms stemmed from a greater feeling on the part of both the government and the public that there was no longer a need for a covert organisation.  Despite the USA not long having expanded their efforts in to the area of intelligence they still associated it more with the organisations of Hitler’s Third Reich, the Abwehr and Gestapo.  This did not lead many in the government and the public to be very sympathetic towards this sort of organisation.  The US government clung to the same view as the 1929 US Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson who noted that ‘Gentlemen do not read each other’s mail.’[8]

These ideas were becoming outdated.  Intelligence had also grown beyond its original pre-World War Two role of simply gathering the intelligence, and thus was unlikely to return to that.[9]  General Vandenburg in the 1946 Senate hearings stated that ‘the pre-war feeling that there was something Un-American about espionage and even about intelligence in general no longer held true.’[10]

Despite the fact that intelligence and ideas about its morality had evolved, the OSS did not avoid the post World War Two reversions.  It did not have a pre-war form to which it could revert and President Truman felt there was no longer any need for it, and political reasons then led to its eventual dissolution.  This happened despite General Donovan arguing for ‘an independent agency, of civilian status, separate from army, navy, or air force control, to function in peacetime as an Intelligence organisation whose responsibility should be the accumulation of Intelligence.’[11]

In 1945 President Truman ordered that the OSS be disbanded.  Many members transferred to the State Department where they were absorbed into the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.[12]  Paine argues that the dissolution of the OSS was rapid after it was taken over by the war department and that when it was finally dead there was a return to ‘the same inefficiency, conflict, and monolithic confusion which General Donovan had predicted if the separate service arms were allowed to handle the Intelligence function.’[13]  President Truman later said at a CIA training session on November 21st 1952 that when he had briefed General Eisenhower for take over of the Presidency, that Eisenhower had been shocked at all the information the President needed to be able to make a decision.  Truman then went on to remark how no central organisation for intelligence had existed when he came to the Presidency and this had led to him often having to read stacks of documents and having people dig for information.[14]  This inefficiency and confusion led President Truman to instruct Secretary of State James Byrnes, Secretary of War Robert Patterson, Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, and Admiral William D. Leahy to form the National Intelligence Authority.  This authority was to effectively take charge of intelligence operations supported by the Central Intelligence Group.  President Truman appointed Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers as Director of Central Intelligence and this was a first step forward in the creation of the CIA.[15]

General Vandenburg, who noted the lack of pre-war intelligence, supported this and pointed out the fact that since the attack at Pearl Harbor intelligence was much better understood.  What General Vandenburg said was revealed by Pearl Harbor, with regards to intelligence, was that there was a need ‘for centralisation, for allocation of responsibility, for dissemination, for evaluation, and for exploitation of all sources of information.’[16]  Senator Elbert D. Thomas was also a supporter of a new central system and argued for what he said should be ‘the most efficient intelligence system that can be devised.’  He was adamant that things should not return to the pre-war system.[17]

The USA was no longer an isolationist nation and had emerged from World War Two as the foremost nation in the West.  This alone made it inevitable that there should be some form of central intelligence organisation.[18]  As it began to become clearer that the Soviet Union was now set for ideological confrontation with the US, it also became clearer that there was going to be a need for a specialised and advanced group for the gathering of intelligence and many other sorts of related operations.[19]

In 1947 an act of Congress, the National Security Act, dissolved the Central Intelligence Group to replace it with the Central Intelligence Agency.  It also created the Department of Defence, and the National Security Council,[20] which was made up of the President, the Vice President, the Director of the Office of Civil and Defence Mobilisation, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defence.  The CIA was to work closely with the National Security Council (NSC).  This had made the CIA almost independent of the military, except for the fact that the Director remained a member of military personnel until Allen Dulles replaced General Walter Bedell Smith in 1953.[21]

The CIA as an organisation therefore officially began its life on the 18th of September 1947.  The National Security Act laid out the role of the CIA in five-functions. The CIA was:

‘to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the government departments and agencies as relate to national security…to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the co-ordination of such intelligence activities…to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the government…Provided that the Agency shall have no police, subpena, [sic] law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions…to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;…to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.’[22]

This gives the CIA the right to co-ordinate, gather and analyse intelligence. However, it was the phrase ‘such other functions and duties’ that allowed it to expand its operations into clandestine, covert, secret wars.[23]


[1] Paine, L. The CIA at Work, (1977) Robert Hale London, UK. P. 9-10

[2] Ibid. P. 10

[3] Wise, D. & Ross, T. The Invisible Government: The CIA and US Intelligence, (1974) Vintage Books, USA. P 91-92

[4] Op Cit. Paine, L. P. 10-11

[5] Op Cit. Wise, D. & Ross, T. P. 93

[6] Op Cit. Paine, L. P. 12

[7] Op Cit. Wise, D. & Ross, T. P. 93

[8] Op Cit. Paine, L. P. 11

[9] Ibid. P. 12

[10] Troy, T. Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency, (1981) Aletheia Books University Publications of America, Inc. USA. P. 381

[11] Op Cit. Paine, L. P. 13

[12] Op Cit. Wise, D. Ross, T. P. 93

[13] Op Cit. Paine, L. P. 13-14

[14] Op Cit. Wise, D. Ross, T. P. 92

[15] Op Cit. Paine, L. P. 14

[16] Op Cit. Troy, T. P. 381

[17] Ibid. P. 379

[18] Op Cit. Wise, D. Ross, T. P. 92

[19] Op Cit. Paine, L. P. 14

[20] Op Cit. Wise, D. Ross, T. P. 94

[21] Op Cit. Paine, L. P. 15-16

[22] Op Cit. Wise, D. Ross, T. P. 94

[23] Ibid. P. 94


Sam Hunter is the author of fiction novel Makaveli’s Prince.

Available on Amazon